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 ABSTRACT
The United States (US) Department of Defense (DoD) Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) protection standard offers a solid basis for
protecting commercial communication, data, and control facilities. Because of the standard’s shielded barrier and test requirements, it is not surprising that there is a strong temptation within industry and government to dismiss the MIL-STD 188-125 approach in favor of less rigorous protection methods. It is important to understand that US DoD EMP protection standard for fixed
facilities, MIL-STD-188-125, reflects an evolution by trial and error that spanned a period of decades beginning with the acquisition of the Minuteman Missile System in the 1960s. In fact, one of the main motivating factors for developing the standard was
that system developers in the Air Force, Army, Navy, and Defense Communications Agency (now Defense Information Systems
Agency) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency tried less technically-sound approaches that failed in their effectiveness, testability, and maintainability. This paper revisits the development of the US DoD standard and explains its provisions and
underlying technical rationale. The paper’s objective is to enable the public officials and engineers involved in planning and implementing EMP protection for critical infrastructure facilities to avoid the pitfalls encountered in the past and use the best practices
available to achieve low risk protection designs that can be maintained over the entire lifecycle of critical infrastructure systems.

T

he United States (US) Department of Defense (DoD) has a
long and strong experience base
in protecting systems against the
nuclear electromagnetic pulse (EMP). The
US DoD’s EMP protection experience dates
back to the 1960s with the development
of the Minuteman Missile system. In the
late 1970s, recognizing the non-uniformity
of EMP protection engineering practices
across the services and problems with initial
certification testing and lifecycle monitoring
and maintenance of EMP protection, efforts
were begun at the Defense Nuclear Agency
(DNA) to standardize EMP environment
criteria and protection engineering requirements. DNA issued the initial contract
to develop a standard EMP environment
waveform in 1980 to Vector Research (now
Metatech, Inc.). This effort was brought to
fruition by the issuance of DoD-STD-2169.
In 1986 DNA, in a competitive procurement, selected SRI International to draft a
protection engineering standard for fixed
ground-based facilities, culminating in
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MIL-STD-188-125-1. In 1987, DNA assembled a technical working group to vet the
standard draft material. The working group
included expert government and contractor
representatives from the Army, Navy, Air
Force, and the Defense Communications
Agency. The working group met at regular
intervals from 1987 to 1991 to edit and
approve the final military standard.
A major issue motivating the development of MIL-STD-188 was that, with few
exceptions, the exact nature and seriousness
of systems malfunctions observed during
EMP tests were not predicted by pre-test
analysis. Analysts found that EMP effects
depend on fine, often trivial, details of
system construction which are difficult
to model. Some details such as parasitic
capacitance and inductance effects and high
voltage breakdown locations are unknown,
even when with detailed engineering drawings available, since these details do not
influence normal system operation. They
found assessments based on paper studies,
visual inspection, exact replication of circuit

schematics, and even low-level testing unreliable (US Defense Nuclear Agency 1995).
The assessment of system EMP vulnerability involves detailed analytical comparison of the EMP stress levels (fields, current,
and/or voltage levels) on the system at a
selected location on the system, with the
strength (current and/or voltage failure
thresholds) at the same location. Figure
1 illustrates the system structural layers
involved in EMP system response modeling
and testing. Note that uncertainties in stress
levels are lowest at the system exterior (corresponding to overall system vulnerability)
and uncertainties in system strength levels
lowest at the system component level. Any
one of these layers can serve as the location
for stress/strength comparisons. Because
our interest is in overall system vulnerability, the ideal location for comparing
stress with strength would be at the system
exterior since we can precisely specify
and impose EMP fields and penetration
currents here. However, for unprotected
systems, since large EMP fields and cur-
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smallest possible number of EMP penetrations (penetrating wires, doors, pipes, and
EXTERIOR
apertures). They acknowledged that adaptations involving isolating mission critical
equipment would permit cost-savings by
INTERNAL CABLE
reducing necessary shielded volumes.
ARTERIES
It is noteworthy that the National Research Council (NRC) committee came to
the same conclusions as the DSB. Like the
SUBSYSTEM
DSB, the NRC report emphasized the large
STRESS
STRENGTH
uncertainties inherent in the entire process
of estimation of currents and voltages at
BOX
the component level and the associated
protection requirements. Their solution was
to recommend controlling system stress
to well-known values by using integral
CIRCUIT CARD
shielding and penetration control at the
system exterior. They also recommended
great emphasis on developing better and less
COMPONENT
expensive means for virtually complete and
Least Predictable
Most Predictable
effective shielding of systems. Their idea was
to put up a tightly shielded barrier to keep
the energy out of the system. This creates
Figure 1. System EMP Coupling Layers
an interior “quiet zone” such that there is
rents are allowed to flow through up to 6
off-the-shelf boxes could be installed no need to predict what happens inside
thus avoiding the associated prediction
coupling layers from the system exterior to
inside the system. The downside
uncertainties. With the proper engineering,
internal components of the system (where
was higher initial costs associated
barrier designs can provide interior field
actual failure occurs), it is very difficult to
with shielding materials. The global
and current levels so low that virtually any
predict system strength to a given exterior
hardening approach was also known
type of electronic component will survive.
stress. The uncertainty in system exterior
as the “fix-test-fix” approach.
The best way to reduce electronics’ strength
strength levels magnifies over the system
uncertainties is to provide a system design
lifecycle since internal system components
The impasse precipitated two high-level
that limits EMP fields and currents at the
are modified or replaced over time.
reviews. The first review, conducted by a
The difficulty in predicting systems’
special convocation of the Defense Science system’s exterior to levels known to be
generally safe – levels comparable to normal
EMP vulnerability had a major effect on
Board (DSB), during 1979-80 focused on
signal background noise.
the evolution of the DoD EMP protection
aircraft protection – “Report of the DSB
approach. An intense debate occurred with Task Force on EMP Hardening of Aircraft
The NRC committee also recommended
the EMP community from the early 1960s
(http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/Reading_Room/ the development of design strategies that
through the 1980s. There were two schools Special_Collections/11-M-1293.pdf) ” The secare testable. A major advantage of global
of thought:
shielding is that testing is much easier –
ond, conducted by the National Research
1. The “tailored hardening” advocates
one must validate only that the outer shield
Council of the National Academies of
maintained that protection should
is effective. The NRC report stated that
Science, during 1982-84 looked at EMP
occur at the box level based on box
if the system shield is such that virtually
protection of systems in general – “Evalfailures observed during system
nothing gets through, periodic tests of the
uation of Methodologies for Estimating
testing. This approach placed a heavy Vulnerability to Electromagnetic Pulse
integrity of the shield and high-level curemphasis on the use of terminal pro- Effects (http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/
rent injection tests on all cables entering the
u2/a144408.pdf) .”
shielded enclosure constitute an adequate
tection devices. The major attraction
The DSB Task Force Report addressed
test. This is important not just for initial
of the tailored approach was its lower
three protection approaches: (1) global
system acceptance tests, but for lifecycle
up-front costs – systems required no
initial EMP hardening and only those system shielding, (2) adaptations involving hardness surveillance testing required for
protecting only mission-essential equipEMP hardness maintenance. If the outer
boxes that failed under test required
system shield certified effective, interior
protection. The tailored hardening
ment, and (3) component hardening. They
approach was also known as the “test- identified two major sources of uncertainty electronics can undergo replacement over
the system lifecycle without fear of comprofix-test” approach.
underlying their recommendations –un2. The “global hardening” advocates
certainties in EMP coupling level (stress)
mising system EMP survivability.
maintained that protection should
analysis, and uncertainties in overall system
The NRC was critical of the tailored
occur at the system exterior level by
failure prediction (strength) analysis. The
hardening approach stating, “The Comincluding an electromagnetic barrier DSB concluded that the tailored protecmittee is uncomfortable with the use of
as part of the initial system design.
tailored hardening to design new systems.”
tion approach had an excessive reliance on
This approach placed a heavy empha- analysis, and the associated uncertainties
They observed that the component-level
in stress and strength levels did not provide protection rather than the system-levsis on external shielding. The major
attraction of the global approach was high confidence in system survivability. The el protection carries much more risk of
Board recommended that the best approach vulnerability, again pointing to inaccuracy
that the external barrier created an
to EMP protection is to use a minimum
electromagnetically “quiet” interior
of analytical EMP coupling and system
number of contiguous shields with the
such that unhardened commercial
response predictions. It is straightforward
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to specify or predict EMP levels outside
a system, but as EMP energy propagates
inside the system, internal wiring complexity makes it very difficult to predict the
levels of currents and voltages that flow to
individual components. The crux of the
global versus tailored protection issue was
that this is where the tailored hardening
proponents were attempting to protect.
It should be noted that the NRC did not
entirely dismiss box level protection, but
observed that protection concepts involving
shielding at the box level could be admissible provided that optical fiber was used for
all box interconnections.
The global shielding approach used by
DoD beginning in the 1980s follows the
recommendations of the DSB and NRC
committees. MIL-STD-188-125-1 embodies the global shielding approach for fixed
ground-based communication and data
centers. MIL-STD-188-125-2 embodies the
global shielding approach for portable and
ground-mobile systems.
Electromagnetically simple systems with
a contiguous shield and having a small
number of protected penetrations engineered by the US DoD can survive EMP.
The engineering principles are straightforward as illustrated in Figure 2:
1. Make the electronics portion of the
system as compact as possible.
2. Enclose these electronics in a single
continuous shield.
3. Limit the number of electromagnetic
penetrations through the shield and
protect all remaining penetrations.
4. Certify the hardness of the system
via shielding effectiveness tests
and current injection tests of cable
penetrations.
5. Periodically retest the shielding and
penetration protection integrity to
maintain hardness over the system
lifecycle.
Numerous systems successfully implemented this approach in their engineer-
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Figure 3. MIL-STD-188-125 Protection Design Example – DSCS Ground Terminal

ing design and fabrication. A partial list
includes:
Missiles (Minuteman Upgrade, Peacekeeper, Air Launched Cruise Missile);
Aircraft (B1-B, TACAMO, E-3A, E-4B);
and Ground Systems (Ground Launched
Cruise Missile, MILSTAR, Ground Wave
Emergency Network, National Military
Command Center, Alternate National
Military Command Center, Defense
Satellite Communication System (DSCS)
Ground Terminals, Pershing launch
control system).
An illustration of the MIL-STD-188
facility outer boundary shield implemented
on the DSCS ground terminals is included
in Figure 3.
It is important to note that the US DoD
standards are test-performance based.
Engineers can use different shield designs
and penetration protection devices, as long
as the shielding effectiveness and penetration currents meet the specified final
acceptance test.
The justification for EMP protection
costs for critical infrastructure systems is

 Provide a global shield
 Minimize number of
penetrations
 Protect each penetration:
filters, arrestors
 Provide facility HM/HS
 Implemented extensively

Figure 2. Notional Illustration of the Global Shielding Approach for Fixed Facilities
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clear when compared to the cost of lost
societal services. For long-term outages
of the electric power grid caused by EMP,
economic losses would measure in trillions
of dollars (Baker 2013). The costs to harden
are a small fraction of system cost for new
systems. For example, the US DoD has
found that EMP protection costs for large
buildings amount to 3 to 8 percent of total
system cost if included in the initial system
design (Gertcher). Costs are manageable
for retrofit protection of existing systems by
isolating critical electronics within shielded
cabinets or rooms.
It is noteworthy that EMP protection has
many benefits in addition to EMP immunity. The MIL-STD-188-125 EMP protection
design enhances signal emanation security
(TEMPEST protection). In addition, DoD
standard protection reduces radio frequency (RF) weapon effects, and is effective
against solar geomagnetic disturbance
effects, electric power outages caused by
line transients, lightning effects, and electromagnetic interference. ¡
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